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SCIENTIFIC RESPONSIBILITY AND 
THE LAW 
Harold P. Green* 
During the past decade, the scientific community has been 
perturbed by a series of revelations of scientific misconduct, 
some including apparent outright fraud or falsification in the 
conduct or reporting of research. The inferences to be drawn 
from these revelations are matters of disagreement.1 Some scien-
tists believe that publicity about these affairs has been "grossly 
exaggerated," conveying the erroneous impression that fraud in 
science is widespread, thereby damaging the image of science, 
and that the mistakes and misinterpretations that do occur are 
inevitably detected and corrected.2 Others worry that the recent 
disclosures signify that fraud in science is widespread,.and that 
these instances of misconduct may represent only the tip of the 
iceberg. One study found thirty-four cases of "known or sus-
pected cases of scientific fraud" from Hipparchus in ancient 
Greece to the immunologist Arthur Hale in 1981. Even more dis-
turbing, fifteen of these cases are post-1970. 3 
The two views of scientific misconduct can be capsulized in 
the comments of Dr. Phillip Handler, former President of the 
National Academy of Sciences, and the book by Nicholas Wade 
and William Broad, two journalists who have investigated scien-
tific fraud. Dr. Handler, speaking before a House Subcommittee, 
argued that, because exposure of scientific fraud is inevitable, 
only "psychopathic behavior" or "minds which ... may be con-
sidered deranged" will produce fraud." On the other hand, 
Broad and Wade assert that Handler's "conventional ideology of 
science" cannot explain the phenomenon of fraud. In their view, 
• Professor of Law, The George Washington University National Law Center. A.B., 
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1. See S1GMA X1, THE Sc1ENTIF1c RESEARCH Soc'v, HONOR IN Sc1ENCE 1-2 (1984) [here-
inafter SIGMA X1]. 
2. See Fraud in Biomedical Research: Hearings on Fraud in Biomedical Research 
Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the House Comm. on Science 
and Technology, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-39 (1981) [hereinafter Hearings on Fraud) 
(statements of Dr. Philip Handler, President, National Academy of Sciences, and Dr. 
Donald Frederickson, Director, Mitional Insts. of Health). 
3. W. BROAD & N. WADE, BETRAYERS OF THE TRUTH 225-32 (1982). 
4. Hearings on Fraud, supra note 2, at 20-21. 
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scientists have a dual motivation: to understand the world and 
to obtain personal recognition. Fraud, they say, is a phenomenon 
that has occurred throughout the history of science, and many of 
those who committed fraud-including such luminaries as 
Newton, Mendel, and Millikan-did so to persuade their col-
leagues of a theory they knew to be correct even though their 
experiments did not turn out exactly as expected.11 Accordingly, 
"history has been kind to scientists such as these . . . because 
the theories turned out to be correct."6 Whatever the reason, al-
though in the past "[t]he occasional instances of misconduct 
were thought to be unique ... , [m]ore recent experience sug-
gests that, at the very least, the incidence of reported miscon-
duct has increased."' 
The scientific community has been sufficiently shaken by re-
cent experiences that many associations, universities, and re-
search institutions have moved to establish procedures for deal-
ing with misconduct in science. The underlying rationale is 
succinctly stated in a report published by the Association of 
American Medical Colleges (AAMC):8 
The responsibility of the scientific community to the 
public is acknowledged. The maintenance of public trust 
in this pursuit is vital to the continuing vigor of the bi-
omedical research enterprise. Loss of this trust because 
of isolated instances of dishonest behavior on the part of 
a few researchers could cause great harm by calling into 
question in the mind of the public the validity of all new 
knowledge and the integrity of the scientific community 
at large. In short, it is in the best interest of the public 
and of academic medicine to prevent misconduct in re-
search and to deal effectively and responsibly with in-
stances where misconduct is suspected.9 
Although Dr. Handler's view was that "falsification of data . 
need not be a matter of general societal concern,"10 the AAMC's 
rationale compels recognition that scientific fraud is indeed a 
matter of societal concern. The responsibility of the scientific 
5. W. BROAD & N. WADE, supra note 3, at 212-13. 
6. Id. at 213. 
7. Special Issue-Policies and Procedures For De9ling with Possible Misconduct in 
Science, 15 NIH GumE, July 18, 1986, at 1 [hereinafter Special Issue]. 
8. ASSOCIATION OF AM. MEDICAL COLLEGES, THE MAINTENANCE OF HIGH ETHICAL STAN-
DARDS IN THE CONDUCT OF RESEARCH (1982) [hereinafter AAMC REPORT]. 
9. Id. at 1. 
10. Hearings on Fraud, supra note 2, at 10. 
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community to the public flows from the fact that scientific re-
search, at least in the nonprofit sector, is funded largely by the 
federal government. Indeed, the reaction to Dr. Handler's point 
of view at a hearing before a House Subcommittee ranged from 
astonishment to outrage.11 
Because public policy is implicated by scientific misconduct, 
the legal profession should be interested in overcoming this 
problem. This Article studies the scientific misconduct problem 
and provides a personal view of the legal dilemmas that confront 
those who report misconduct. Part I describes how the scientific 
community currently deals with alleged fraud. Scientists primar-
ily rely on the peer review system and toothless guidelines. Part 
II illustrates the problems in the present system through a case 
study of an allegation of misconduct. The author represented a 
man who reported scientific misconduct; the National Institutes 
of Health (NIH) investigation took five and one-half years. This 
Article concludes that lawyers should become more involved in 
the investigation and adjudication of scientific fraud to assist 
the scientific community in preserving the due process rights of 
the accused, maintaining the integrity of the scientific commu-
nity, and encouraging exposure of misconduct. 
I. EXISTING APPROACHES TO DEALING WITH MISCONDUCT 
Only five years ago, very few institutions had given any signifi-
cant thought to the problem of dealing with scientific miscon-
duct. As Dr. Handler testified, "I will admit ... the absence of 
any sense of what due process should be when some suspicion is 
aroused."12 To be sure, the problems of due process are daunt-
ing. First, the substantive content of "misconduct" has never 
been defined in a generally accepted man~er. A significant ques-
tion is whether the elements of misconduct should be codified, 
or whether they should evolve, like the common law, on a case-
by-case basis. Second, an allegation of scientific fraud can im-
pact substantially on several important interests that warrant 
protection. 
Obviously an allegation of fraud, regardless of how it is re-
solved, can have a profound effect on the career of the alleged 
wrongdoer. It may also impact his or her supervisors and coau-
11. Hearings on Fraud, supra note 2. 
12. Id. at 43. 
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thors,13 as well as those who "refereed" the reports of the re-
search prior to publication. The employing institution is in a po-
tential "catch-22" situation. A confirmation that fraud has taken 
place suggests that the institution has employed less than ade-
quate supervisory, review, and quality control procedures, and 
this cannot help but be damaging to the institution. On the 
other hand, failure to seek out the truth could be equally dam-
aging. If the research has been publicly funded, particularly if it 
is in some way politically sensitive, allegations of fraud could 
produce substantial political fallout. If the suggestion or accusa-
tion of fraud comes from a "whistle-blower" colleague, that col-
league has an interest in how the matter is handled. Whistle-
blowers are subject to retaliatory action by the institution, by 
colleagues, and by the accused. They, however, should be held 
accountable if it turns out that the allegations were clearly un-
founded, irresponsible, or viciously motivated. 
It is understandable that scientists would have some difficulty 
in coping unassisted with due process implications of such is-
sues. If, however, these issues raise public policy questions re-
quiring changed procedures and reform of long-accepted princi-
ples, the legal profession has a great deal to off er science in a 
serious and constructive effort to cope with these new, or newly 
perceived, problems. 
A. The Peer Review System 
Science is a vast enterprise embracing many diverse disci-
plines. These disciplines are frequently broken down into sub-
disciplines. The disciplines, and often the subdisciplines, may 
have little in common with each other except that they are all 
concerned with the acquisition of knowledge and the pursuit of 
truth. Although it has been asserted that "the principles gov-
erning the way that research is carried out and reported are the 
same in geography as in physics, in medicine as in archaeology," 
it must also be recognized that "habits and conventions" differ 
from one field to another.14 
Science is not a profession like medicine and law. One does 
not need a license to practice science; and, although those scien-
13. It was reported in February 1987 that a respected NIH scientist committed sui-
cide as a result of pressures resulting from an investigation he helped initiate of alleged 
scientific fraud by a member of his staff. NIH Scientist a Suicide Amid Probe of Paper, 
Wash. Post, Feb. 14, 1987, at Al, col. 4. 
14. SIGMA XI. supra note 1, at 23. 
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tists concerned with a particular discipline or subdiscipline or-
ganize associations or societies, these are generally concerned 
only with advancing the state of knowledge within their sphere 
and not with determining the qualifications or establishing stan-
dards of conduct for their members. 
For these reasons, science has no formal mechanism for self-
regulation and no formalized ethical codes. This is not to say, 
however, that science is a refuge for villains and charlatans. 
There are informal but regularized ways in which candidates are 
admitted to, and advance within, science. These center upon the 
process of "peer review."u 
Recognition of scientific scholarship is a function of the scien-
tist's research accomplishments. These accomplishments become 
known when scientific journals publish descriptions of a scien-
tist's research and its results. Scientific journals are, however, 
"refereed." The journal will send the manuscript to scientists re-
garded as the author's peers for critical comment, suggestions 
for improvement, and a recommendation whether the paper 
warrants publication. The peers who act as referees are, there-
fore, the gatekeepers who, in conjunction with the editors, con-
trol access to, and advancement in, the world of science. If the 
research and results described in the article are sound, other 
scientists should be able to repeat the research and obtain the 
same results. It is in this sense that it can be said that 
"[s]cientists may be fallible, but science is self-correcting,"16 
since inability to replicate the reported results signals that there 
has been error on the part of the author of the paper. 
There are, however, some potential problems with the peer re-
view system. Peers naturally tend to relate the quality of a paper 
to the manner in which it builds on existing knowledge. Peer 
review is therefore a force for conservatism that tends to dis-
courage large steps forward and unorthodoxy generally.17 More-
over, at the same time peer review operates as a defense against 
scientific error or misconduct, it provides splendid opportunity 
for the referees to engage in misconduct of their own. Peers are, 
after all, at least potential competitors of the scientist whose 
manuscript they are reviewing, and they can attempt to turn 
their function to personal advantage by the suggestions and rec-
15. Id. 
16. Id. at 2. 
17. See W. BROAD & N. WADE, supra note 3, at 100-02. 
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ommendations they make or, indeed, by appropriation of ideas 
or information in the manuscript.18 
Peer review has not uncovered major pieces of outright scien-
tific fraud that have been published in major journals and gar-
nered honors for their authors. For example, belated inquiry 
into the research of Dr. John Darsee at Emory and Harvard 
Universities led to the retraction of numerous articles he had 
published in refereed medical journals because of apparent falsi-
fication of research and research results. These phenomena may 
be attributable to the lethargy, ineptness, or negligence of the 
referees or to the cleverness of the culprit. On the other hand, it 
has been asserted that a referee "is not a cop and should not be 
expected to determine whether a research report has been hon-
estly produced," but rather is expected only to advise whether 
the reported results are sufficiently important to merit 
publication.19 
An article published in Nature in January i987 used the Dar-
see case to explore the prevalence of apparent misconduct not-
withstanding peer review.2° From 1978 to 1981, Darsee was au-
thor or coauthor of eighteen full-length research papers 
published in major journals and of about one hundred abstracts, 
book chapters, reviews, and short papers. A total of forty-seven 
scientists had coauthored one or more of these publications with 
him. The Nature article, by two NIH scientists, Walter W. 
Stewart and Ned Feder, reviewed these papers, which they con-
ceded were a "sample of convenience,"21 and not necessarily rep-
resentative, to explore the vigilance of referees, editors of the 
journals, and Darsee's coauthors in "meeting the standards con-
ventionally accepted as necessary in the scientific literature."22 
Recognizing that the finding of "errors" was in part subjective 
and that many of the errors and discrepancies they found were 
"minor," they nevertheless reported that most of the papers 
contained "errors or discrepancies that can be recognized simply 
by examining them carefully,"23 and that some errors were "so 
18. Dr. Handler pointed out that "perhaps fifty knowledgeable individuals ... have 
such an opportunity" to misappropriate an idea contained in a research proposal they 
referee, and reported with gratification that accounts of "transgressions" are "very, very 
rare indeed." Hearings on Fraud, supra note 2, at 21. 
19. SIGMA X1, supra note 1, at 6. 
20. Stewart & Feder, The Integrity of the Scientific Literature, 325 NATURE 207 
(1987). 
21. Id. at 207. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
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glaring as to offend common sense. "2' As an example of the lat-
ter, they cited a paper depicting a family with a high incidence 
of an unusual form of heart disease. The family pedigree, as de-
scribed in the Darsee paper, indicated that a seventeen-year-old 
male had four children ranging in age from four to eight; his 
sister, brother, and first cousin had their first children at ages 
sixteen, fifteen, and fifteen respectively; and three women in the 
family had their last children at ages forty-one, forty-five, and 
fifty-two. 211 
Stewart and Feder reported that among the eighteen research 
papers there were as many as thirty-nine errors or discrepancies 
in a single paper, with an average of about twelve per paper.26 Of 
the twenty-two scientists who were coauthors of a research pa-
per, nineteen were coauthors of at least one paper with ten or 
more errors or discrepancies. 27 In addition, Stewart and Feder 
found that in numerous cases the coauthors had not retained the 
data on which the publications were based;28 that in many cases 
the coauthors were merely "honorary authors" with no direct in-
volvement in the research;29 that some papers embo~ied state-
ments and data that impeded the reader's ability to reconstruct 
the manner in which the research was conducted;30 and that a 
number of the papers had previously been published in a differ-
ent journal without attribution in the subsequent paper.31 
24. Id. at 208. 
25. An editorial in Nature lamely suggests that the "bizarre pedigree" would be less 
puzzling "if the ages given in the original paper were intended to mean something other 
than chronological age." Editorial, Fraud, Libel and The Literature, 325 NATURE 181, 
182 (1987); see infra note 31. 
26. Stewart & Feder, supra note 20, at 209. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 210. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 211. The Stewart-Feder article was first submitted to Nature in 1983, 
which declined to publish it in its original form because of threats of libel suits. Edito-
rial, supra note 25, at 181. After considerable give and take, a revised version was finally 
published. Still, the article carries a bold type legend stating that "(s]ome editorial 
changes have been made in this manuscript without the consent of the authors." Stewart 
& Feder, supra note 20, at 214. The article is preceded in the same issue by an editorial 
critical of the authors, skeptical of their methodology, but concluding "for all this, what 
Stewart and Feder have written deserves close attention." Fraud, Libel and the Litera-
ture, supra, at 182. In addition, immediately following the Stewart and Feder article was 
a "reply" by Dr. Eugene Braunwald, who was Darsee's supervisor at Harvard and who 
reportedly was among those who threatened a libel suit. Braunwald, On Analysing Sci-
entific Fraud, 325 NATURE 215 (1987). 
According to an article by Philip M. Boffey in April 1986, based on an earlier (proba-
bly the original) version of the manuscript, Stewart and Feder concluded that many of 
the Darsee coauthors had engaged in " 'misconduct' with the potential to undermine the 
accuracy of science," and "that they 'knew or should have known' " that some of the 
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B. Guidelines for Scientific Conduct 
1. The Edsall Report- The beginnings, although indirect, of 
the scientific community's efforts to deal with scientific miscon-
duct came with the establishment by the American Association 
for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) of a Committee on Sci-
entific Freedom and Responsibility. The impetus, in part, for its 
establishment was the concern that two scientists were retali-
ated against by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) because 
they had vigorously and publicly argued that the AEC's stan-
dards for protection against ionizing radiation were too lax. The 
committee was initially established in response to Senator Ed-
mund Muskie's request that the AAAS look into the allegations 
of administrative harassment of the scientists, but the AAAS 
soon thereafter decided to broaden the inquiry . 
. Accordingly, the committee was charged (1) to study and re-
port on the general conditions required for scientific freedom 
and responsibility, (2) to develop suitable criteria and proce-
dures for the objective and impartial study of these problems, 
and (3) to recommend review mechanisms for instances where 
scientific freedom is alleged to have been abridged or otherwise 
endangered, or where responsible scientific conduct is alleged to 
have been violated. 32 The committee had a blue-chip member-
ship, including former Chief Justice Earl Warren.33 
The committee was constituted in December 1970, and its fi-
nal report, prepared for the committee by Dr. John T. Edsall, 
Professor Emeritus of Biochemistry at Harvard University, was 
submitted in 1975.3" Because at that time concerns about wide-
spread scientific fraud had not yet begun to emerge, it is not 
surprising that the Edsall Report did not deal with the subject 
directly. Rather, the Report concentrated on the responsibilities 
of scientists with respect to, first, the conduct of scientific activi-
ties that might be harmful to society and, second, the failure of 
scientists to conduct and support activities that might be benefi-
statements in their publications were false. Boffey, Major Study Points to Faulty Re-
search at Two Universities, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1986, at Cl, col. 4. 
32. The third charge originally called upon the committee to study and report on 
specific instances rather than to develop mechanisms to enable such review. The charge 
seems to have been modified because of doubts that the AAAS should enter the thicket 
of passing judgment on specific cases. 
33. The history encapsulated in this and the preceding paragraph is based on a re-
view of documents on file at the AAAS offices in Washington, D.C. 
34. J. EDSALL, SCIENTIFIC FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY (1975) (report of AAAS 
Comm. on Scientific Freedom & Responsibility). 
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cial. Accordingly, the Report's main thrust related to issues of 
the kind raised by the AEC's alleged harrassment of scientists 
for speaking out contrary to the "party line" and to "whistle-
blowing" generally. 
Issues of scientific freedom and scientific responsibility were 
regarded as "basically inseparable."Sli In the committee's view, 
scientific freedom is not in any sense unique, but is granted by 
society as necessary for the advancement of beneficial knowl-
edge. 36 Scientific freedom is therefore dependent upon the exer-
cise of the responsibilities that arise from the possession of spe-
cial knowledge. When scientists become aware of action or 
inaction in the realm of science that they believe will be harmful 
to the public interest, they have both the right and the responsi-
bility to blow the whistle, but "the responsibilities are pri-
mary."37 In other words, the Edsall Report takes the position 
that scientists should be encouraged to be whistle-blowers when 
serious issues are involved and that they should have assurance 
of some form of due process in passing judgment on the ques-
tions they raise. 38 
Although the Edsall Report did not explicitly address scien-
tific misconduct, it laid down a principle that is clearly relevant: 
"One of the basic responsibilities of scientists is to maintain the 
quality and integrity of the work of the scientific community."39 
Scientists, therefore, have a duty to blow the whistle when they 
have reason to believe there is scientific fraud. Moreover, the 
Edsall Report explicitly condemns other forms of misconduct in-
herent in the peer review system-opportunities for misappro-
priation and the taking of unfair advantage.4° 
2. The Sigma Xi statement- The principle that scientists 
have an affirmative responsibility to expose dishonest or unac-
ceptable practices in science received further support in 1984 
with the publication of a statement by Sigma Xi, the honor soci-
ety of science, that was intended as "practical advice" to those 
entering careers in science;n The statement views whistle-blow-
ing as necessary to maintain the integrity of scientific research, 
and tells young scientists they cannot turn their backs on scien-
tific misconduct. At the same time, the honor society cautions 




39. Id. at 8. 
40. Id. at 8-10. 
41. SIGMA X1, supra note 1, at preface. 
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young scientists that one who blows the whistle faces "problems 
and danger~" including the hostility of colleagues, academic cen-
sure, dismissal, professional ostracism, and lawsuits.'2 
3. The AAMC recommendation- In 1984, the Association of 
American Medical Colleges (AAMC) recommended to its mem-
bers that they should adopt procedures to investigate and re-
solve allegations of fraud in an expeditious, thoughtful, fair, and 
judicious manner.43 Guidelines for such procedures were also 
suggested. According to the AAMC, a principal consideration in 
such procedures should be protection of the rights and reputa-
tions of all parties involved, including those who reported the 
perceived misconduct in good faith;" The guidelines contem-
plate an initial review by the dean or the institution head to 
screen out "blatantly frivolous" allegations, followed by an "ini-
tial review" by a committee to determine whether further inves-
tigation is required. If the committee recommends further ac-
tion, the researcher involved is to be notified along with any 
collaborators and an investigation is to be conducted.'11 If the 
allegations are not substantiated by a thorough investigation, 
"appropriate action" should be taken against the whistle-blower 
if his or her "involvement in leveling unfounded charges was 
demonstrated to have been malicious or intentionally 
dishonest. "'6 
4. The government approach to fraud- The problem of sci-
entific misconduct is one that should be dealt with in the first 
instance by the employing institution, but federal funding agen-
cies obviously have a strong interest in the integrity of science at 
institutions that are their grantees. These agencies have begun 
to consider adopting rules to ensure that cases of alleged or sus-
pected misconduct are adequately and fairly investigated and re-
solved . ., The adequate and fair resolution of these cases involves 
a number of issues that must be clarified. First, scientific mis-
conduct must be defined. Second, the duty of enforcement must 
be placed on the research institutions so that concern for repu-
42. Id. at 29 (quoting Oakes, Protecting the Rights of Whistleblowers and the Ac-
cused in Federally Supported Biomedical Research, in WHISTLEBLOWING IN BIOMEDICAL 
RESEARCH 111, 111 (J. Swazey & S. Scher eds. 1982)). 
43. AAMC REPORT, supra note 8, at 3. 
44. Id. at 4. 
45. Id. at 4-5. 
46. Id. at 6. 
47. On July 18, 1986, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) published Policies and 
Procedures for Dealing with Possible Misconduct in Science. Special Issue, supra note 
7. 
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tation does not preempt thorough investigations. Third, the de-
gree of protection accorded whistle-blowers must be determined. 
A threshold question is the definition of scientific fraud, and 
whether this definition should be codified. There are some kinds 
of conduct that all scientists would condemn. No one would ar-
gue that it is justifiable for scientists to fabricate or deliberately 
misrepresent research results or to use their participation in the 
peer review process for advancement of personal objectives. Be-
yond these obvious cases, however, there are murky differences 
between fraud, on the one hand, and error, carelessness, or poor 
practices on the other; the ambiguities are compounded when 
one gets into the traditions, courtesies, and practices associated 
with scientific publications and journals. Moreover, the stan-
dards, or at least the relevant "habits and conventions"48 for de-
termining misconduct may vary from one scientific discipline to 
another. For example, one would expect that judgment would be 
at least somewhat different for astronomy than for medical sci-
ence; and even within medical science, the standards might vary 
depending upon whether the researcher was a scientist, a physi-
cian, or both, in connection with the particular conduct.· 
These difficulties make it unlikely that a substantive code of 
scientific probity could be formulated easily. One is tempted to 
suggest, assuming the investigation is adequate and in good 
faith, that, like hard-core pornography, one knows scientific mis-
conduct when one sees it. The questions whether codification 
should be attempted and, if so, how the effort should be imple-
mented, are ones that could usefully be considered in the con-
text of constructive collaboration between scientists and lawyers. 
The legal profession, after all, has had generations of experience 
in attempting to codify some very difficult concepts. 
In July 1986, the Public Health Service (PHS) published poli-
cies and procedures for handling scientific misconduct in which 
it undertook to define "scientific misconduct" in the context of 
the use of PHS research funds and direct transactions with the 
PHS. 49 The definition embraces 
(1) serious deviation, such as fabrication, falsification, or 
plagiarism, from accepted practices in carrying out re-
search or in reporting the results of research; or (2) mate-
rial failure to comply with Federal requirements affecting 
specific aspects of the conduct of research-e.g., the pro-
48. See supra text accompanying note 14. 
49. Special Issue, supra note 7. 
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tection of human subjects and the welfare of laboratory 
animals.110 
Excluded from the definition are deviations from policies that 
may result from a "weakness in institutional controls or dis-
agreements between an awardee institution and a PHS compo-
nent. "111 More significantly, the definition does not encompass 
"certain types of possibly inappropriate practices that should be 
of concern to scientists everywhere but do not necessarily call 
for Federal action. . . . [These include] coauthorship practices, 
recognition of collaborators, and multiple publication."112 Al-
though such practices are not within the scope of the policies 
and procedures, the PHS "encourages institutions, professional 
societies and individual scientists to address [such] broad ques-
tions of scientific conduct."113 Essentially similar guidelines have 
been promulgated by the National Science Foundation (NSF) 
for dealing with misconduct under NSF grants. 114 
Once the definition of scientific misconduct has been ascer-
tained, the research institutions must enforce it. It is imperative 
that institutions employing scientists clearly understand that 
scientific misconduct will not be tolerated, and that the burden 
of policing scientific conduct rests squarely upon them. They 
must be convinced that even though a determination that one of 
their scientists engaged in misconduct may cost them "points" 
with granting agencies and others, by indicating that their su-
pervision of research may not have been adequate, whitewashing 
scientific misconduct will cost them even more. Although it is 
important that investigations proceed with due regard for pro-
tection of the reputation and interests of those who are "ac-
cused," the primary purpose of the investigation is to reach a 
just conclusion, not to protect reputations. 1111 These are messages 
that must be delivered by the federal granting agencies, and it is 
important that these agencies be more than pious preachers. In-
deed, there should probably be some kind of appeal/review 




54. 52 Fed. Reg. 4158 (1987) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 689) (proposed Feb. 10, 
1987). 
55. The emphasis on protecting reputations probably reflects a predisposition within 
the scientific community to regard scientific fraud as a rare event and a presumption 
that allegations of fraud will turn out not to have substance. Interestingly, there seems to 
be little concern about the reputation of the whistle-blower. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 42, 44; see also Special Issue, supra note 7, at 11, 34. 
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mechanism for monitoring decisions reached and actions taken 
by grantee institutions with respect to alleged scientific miscon-
duct. Here again, lawyers can be helpful in developing such 
procedures. 
Lastly, even if institutions shrink from actively encouraging 
whistle-blowing "snitches," those who have the courage to blow 
the whistle should be protected and given some measure of pre-
sumption of having acted in good faith. As noted above, both 
Sigma Xi and AAAS encourage scientists to take the initiative in 
bringing reasonably founded suspicions that a colleague's re-
search involves misconduct to the attention of the appropriate 
authorities.118 Indeed, whistle-blowing may be the single most 
important means for discouraging and exposing scientific mis-
conduct. A belief that colleagues will lack the stomach or the 
will to blow the whistle undoubtedly encourages some scientists 
to seek personal gain from misconduct. On the other hand, it is 
probably true that most whistle-blowers' allegations will ulti-
mately prove baseless and motivated by animosity, personal 
grievances, personality problems, and the like.117 
The treatment of whistle-blowers therefore presents impor-
tant and difficult issues in formulating procedures for dealing 
with scientific misconduct. Existing procedures do not contem-
plate a role for the whistle-blower in the inquiry, but usually 
drop the whistle-blower from the cast of relevant characters. 
Once the whistle is blown, the institution's organs for inquiry 
and investigation take over. If the whistle-blower is involved at 
all, it is likely to be only as a witness. Provision is not made for 
keeping whistle-blowers apprised of the progress of the investi-
gation, and they are not given the· opportunity to comment on 
preliminary findings of fact and conclusions. 
In other words, the position of the whistle-blower is analogous 
to that of the individual who witnesses the commission of a fel-
ony by an acquaintance and calls the police. The matter is then 
in the hands of the police and the prosecutors, and the com-
plainant is regarded as one with no special interest, beyond that 
of any citizen, in seeing that justice is done. An inquiry into sci-
entific fraud that has been initiated by a whistle-blower is, how-
56. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text. 
57. The author was an original member of the AAAS Committee on Scientific Free-
dom and Responsibility established pursuant to the recommendations in the Edsall Re-
port. See J. EDSALL, supra note 34. During the term of his membership, the committee 
actively solicited whistle-blowers to bring their allegations to the committee for consider-
ation. In the author's opinion, a substantial majority of the cases presented to the com-
mittee were without merit. 
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ever, very much different. To begin with, there is no prosecution 
and no prosecutor, but only an investigation to uncover the 
facts. Moreover, as noted above, there may be strong motiva-
tions for the institution to reach the conclusion that there has 
been no misconduct. Finally, the whistle-blower does have a 
strong personal interest in the outcome, because she is subject to 
criticism and hostility from the scientific community if the 
charges are determined to be without foundation, and to disci-
plinary action if, beyond this, it is determined that she acted 
with improper intent. 
II. WHISTLEBLOWING-A CASE STUDY 
The centrality of the whistle-blower's role, as well as the ten-
dency to give him relatively short shrift, is vividly illustrated in 
a case in which the writer was actively involved for the past six 
years.68 
In October 1981, Dr. Jerome Jacobstein, a nuclear medicine 
specialist, had reason to believe that one of his colleagues at 
Cornell University Medical College (CUMC), Dr. Jeffrey Borer, 
a cardiologist, had misrepresented research methodology so as to 
make his research results look better; and that in so doing Dr. 
Borer had, in at least one instance, led a medical student who 
was working on research supervised by Dr. Borer to believe that 
it was not improper to mischaracterize methodology so long as 
the research results as reported were sound. At the time, Dr. Ja-
cobstein's concerns did not involve a published paper, but rather 
a draft "talking paper" prepared by the student and a draft 
manuscript of an article that was subsequently published.69 Af-
ter several weeks of agonizing soul-searching, and after writing 
to Dr. Borer to state his concerns and request an explanation 
(Dr. Borer did not respond), Dr. Jacobstein discussed the matter 
with the Medical School Dean on December 14, 1981. 
The Dean hastily organized a committee of three medical 
school faculty members to conduct an inquiry to determine if 
the allegations warranted a full-fledged investigation and hear-
58. For news stories about this case, see Part I: Chronicle of a Scientific Misconduct 
Case, Sc1. & Gov'T REP., Nov. 1, 1986, at 1; Part II: Chronicle of a Scientific Misconduct 
Case, Set & Gov'T REP., Nov. 15, 1986, at 1; Part III: Chronicle of a Scientific Miscon-
duct Case, Sc1. & Gov'T REP., Dec. 1, 1986, at 1; NIH Upholds Misconduct Charges in 
Cornell Case, Sc1. & Gov'T REP., Oct. 1, 1987, at 5; Palca, Cornell Misconduct Case 
Grinds Slowly to its Conclusion, 326 NATURE 816 (1987). 
59. See infra note 66 and accompanying text. 
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ing. The committee met for several hours in the afternoon and 
early evening of Friday, December 18, 1981, and heard from Dr. 
Jacobstein, Dr. Borer, and the medical student. Although Dr. Ja-
cobstein informed the committee that his suspicions were sup-
ported by documentary evidence, including the research data 
books, the committee apparently did not deem it necessary to 
request or to examine any papers. Before the committee ad-
journed that evening, the chairman wrote in his own hand a 
three sentence note to the dean informing him that it was the 
unanimous view of the committee that no further action was 
warranted with respect to the allegations. 
At that point, Dr. Jacobstein retained me to represent him in 
his effort to obtain a fair inquiry into his allegations. He empha-
sized that he wished to pursue this, despite the fact that he had 
already accepted a new position at another institution, because 
of his strong sense of scientific and social responsibility. He was 
convinced that the committee's inquiry had not been fair, be-
cause he knew with certainty that the relevant documents sup-
ported his allegations. At the same time, he recognized the pos-
sibility that there might be a satisfactory explanation for Dr. 
Borer's apparent misconduct. Hence, his objective was to obtain 
a fair inquiry, not to convict Dr. Borer. 
Over the next few months, Dr. Jacobstein paid several thou-
sand dollars for my services. When I recognized that the matter 
would probably be drawn out over a long period of time and that 
fees for my services would impose enormous financial burdens 
on Dr. Jacobstein, I undertook to continue my representation 
pro bono publico. 
Cornell's internal review procedures were inadequate. When 
we sought to interest the University President's Office in the 
matter, the Office referred the matter to the university's house 
counsel. An attorney in that office, after five months of fruitless 
discussion as to acceptable procedures for a satisfactory inquiry, 
candidly asserted that his function was to represent the interests 
of the medical school. This assertion caused me to break off the 
discussions. When I informed him that I intended to take the 
matter to the NIH, he threatened orally and in writing that Dr. 
Jacobstein and I would be held legally accountable for any dam-
age that might result to the University and its personnel because 
of Dr. Jacobstein's allegations. It seems clear that the Univer-
sity's objective was to get rid of the problem as quickly as possi-
ble because Dr. Borer was a prominent researcher who attracted 
substantial funds to the University. Significantly, shortly after 
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the matter was referred to the NIH, Dr. B<;>rer was appointed to 
an endowed chair at Cornell. 
The case was ref erred to the NIH on June 8, 1982, and the 
NIH initiated an inquiry that continued for five and one-half 
years. It appears from the history of the matter there that the 
NIH was more interested in developing facts that would exoner-
ate Dr. Borer than it was in facts that would support the allega-
tions against him. On the other hand, although the NIH had no 
procedures requiring this, Dr. Jacobstein was given access to the 
NIH reports at various stages of its inquiry, with a full opportu-
nity to comment. It is not suggested, therefore, that the NIH 
sought to "whitewash" Dr. Borer; rather, its role seems more 
properly explicable as stemming from a reluctance to believe 
that a scientist of Dr. Borer's stature (and an NIH alumnus) 
would be guilty of misconduct. 
On September 18, 1987, the Director of the NIH made a final 
decision on the Cornell affair based on the NIH Committee's in-
vestigation. The NIH concluded that the subject of the Cornell 
committee's inquiry of December 18, 1981, based on the issues 
Dr. Jacobstein originally raised, "could not be adjudicated."60 
Nevertheless, the NIH Committee found significant departures 
from the acceptable standard of "record-keeping, of collecting 
and recording data, and of reporting results" of research in two 
subsequently published papers Dr. Jacobstein brought to the at-
tention of the NIH.61 It also concluded that there was "no evi-
dence of intentional misconduct in the part of Dr. Borer."62 
Moreover, Cornell's inquiry into the matter was faulted. 
In reaching these conclusions, the NIH obviously made find-
ings against Dr. Borer only when they were clearly documented 
beyond doubt. It was unwilling to balance the conflicting conten-
tions in light of their plausibility and how they fit within the 
overall pattern of conduct revealed in the investigation. For ex-
ample, Dr. Jacobstein's original charges were totally consistent 
60. Memorandum from Associate Director for Extramural Affairs, Office of Extramu-
ral Research, to Director of the National Institutes of Health 5 (Sept. 17, 1987) [herein-
after Decision Memorandum] (decision regarding the NIH investigation of alleged mis-
conduct at Cornell University Medical College and proposed actions) (copy on file with 
U. MICH. J.L. REF.). The basis for this conclusion was that there were "wide discrepancies 
between the account of Dr. Jacobstein and the accounts of Dr. Borer and the other par-
ticipants in the research" that could not be evaluated in the absence of a published 
paper. Office of Extramural Research, National Insts. of Health, Review of Alleged Mis-
representations on the Part of Jeffrey S. Borer, M.D., Cornell University Medical College 
8 (1987) (copy on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.). 
61. Decision Memorandum, supra note 60, at 2. 
62. Id. 
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with the conduct of Dr. Borer that the NIH found not to meet 
accepted standards. Despite this fact, the NIH gave no weight to 
Dr. Jacobstein's original charges. Similarly, the NIH did not in-
fer "intentional misconduct" from the careless research and re-
porting practices that all made Dr. Borer's research results look 
better and more credible. 
Nevertheless, the NIH imposed fairly stiff sanctions against 
Dr. Borer. The principal sanction requires, for the next three 
years, that a copy of the NIH findings be provided to any NIH 
official who is considering appointing Dr. Borer to a committee 
or awarding a grant in which he would be the principal investi-
gator or project leader.83 
With respect to the adequacy of Cornell's internal investiga-
tion in December 1981, the NIH observed that "[b]ecause Dr. 
Jacobstein's original allegations related to a talking paper and a 
draft manuscript, CUMC's conclusion not to pursue the matter 
may have been appropriate at the time," but that its "hasty con-
duct of the inquiry, and the failure to document the findings un-
til later, created understandable doubts about the institution's 
willingness to deal with a potential problem."64 The bottom line 
was that the NIH officially expressed concern over Cornell's re-
view of Dr. Jacobstein's allegations of misconduct.6 1i 
The NIH let Cornell off too gently. This is evidenced by the 
NIH investigation of a 1983 article by Dr. Borer that Dr. Jacob-
stein alleged contained inaccurate and unsupported state-
ments. 66 The most egregious of the article's misstatements was 
that certain medications were withheld from the test subjects 
before the experiment. In its draft final decision of February 
1987, the NIH concluded that this statement was not accurate. 
Thereupon Cornell, which had previously assured the NIH that 
its own investigation showed that Dr. Jacobstein's allegations 
were without merit, issued a press release. The press release ac-
knowledged that there had indeed been "an error" in the article, 
and that Dr. Borer had written a letter to the American Journal 
of Cardiology about this inaccuracy.67 The NIH ultimately con-
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 9. 
65. Id. at 3. 
66. Jordan, Borer, Zullo, Hayes, Kubo, Moses & Carter, Exercise Versus Cold Tem-
perature Stimulation During Radionuclide Cineangiography: Diagnostic Accuracy in 
Coronary Artery Disease, 51 J. A.M.A. 1091 (1983). It was a draft of this paper that was 
one of the bases for Dr. Jacobstein's original allegations against Dr. Borer. 
67. Dr. Borer originally reported that only 4 of 54 patients had received the medica-
tion within 24 hours of the study. See New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center, Press 
Release (Apr. 17, 1987) (copy on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.). 
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eluded in its final decision that a "quarter to a third" of the 
patients received the medication within twenty-four hours of the 
testing, and that Dr. Borer and Cornell failed to reveal in their 
previous disclosures the full extent of the erroneous statement in 
the published article. 68 
The NIH's final decision served to vindicate Dr. Jacobstein 
even though it was based on matters other than those originally 
raised by him. On the other hand, the NIH's handling of the 
case, aside from taking more than five years to complete, ap-
pears to be less than adequate from the standpoint of the public 
interest. Indeed, the final decision raises almost as many policy 
questions as it answers. 
NIH policy places primary responsibility on universities and 
other research institutions to deal with alleged scientific fraud 
and misconduct. Its excessively gentle treatment of Dr. Borer's 
culpability and Cornell's role raises considerable questions as to 
the extent to which the NIH is prepared to go to ensure that the 
institutions discharge their responsibility appropriately. 
CONCLUSION 
The Cornell case is unusual, probably unique, in a number of 
respects. The whistle-blower was exceptionally motivated by his 
sense of scientific and social responsibility, and persisted in his 
campaign with tenacity over a six year period. Moreover, he had 
the unusual assistance of legal counsel in his efforts. A less dedi-
cated scientist, and one who did not have the resources to pay 
for a lawyer or the good fortune to find one who would represent 
him pro bono, would probably retreat from the cause, discred-
ited and with a tarnished reputation. Those, like Dr. Jacobstein, 
who uphold and defend principles of scientific responsibility and 
integrity deserve better of the system. For these reasons, and 
because legitimate whistle-blowing requires considerable princi-
ple and courage, the whistle-blower is entitled to more consider-
ation in an investigation initiated by his or her charges. At the 
very least, there should be an opportunity to participate in the 
proceedings, or in portions of them, as more than a witness: a 
right to be represented by counsel and perhaps to play a role 
analogous to that of prosecutor. Certainly, there should be the 
same opportunity that is afforded to the alleged wrongdoer to 
comment on preliminary findings of fact and conclusions. 
68. Decision Memorandum, supra note 60, at 8. 
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Finally, in one way or another, concern about possible liability 
or expense arising out of defamation actions should be elimi-
nated from, or at least greatly minimized in, situations involving 
possible scientific misconduct. This is another area in which the 
scientific community could benefit from legal inputs. One way to 
accomplish this would be to require-as a condition of employ-
ment as a research scientist-the execution of an instrument re-
leasing from defamation liability any person who in the future 
makes any statements to officials of any scientific, educational, 
or governmental entity to the effect that the employee has en-
gaged in scientific misconduct, unless the statements made are 
determined to be untrue, without any reasonable basis, and to 
have been made with malice. Another approach would be for in-
stitutions to indemnify a whistle-blower for litigation expenses 
and judgments in defamation actions growing out of his or her 
allegations that another scientist has engaged in scientific mis-
conduct, unless, of course, it is determined that the allegations 
were untrue, without a reasonable basis, and made with malice. 
In a society such as the United States, committed to scientific 
advance, much of which is supported by the government, it is 
particularly important that the integrity of science be main-
tained. Major reforms are needed, both in the way institutions 
deal internally with alleged scientific misconduct and in govern-
mental procedures for ensuring the integrity of science. Al-
though the legal profession to date has sat on the sidelines, and 
the scientific community may look upon its entering the game as 
superfluous, or perhaps even undesirable, much can be gained, 
and nothing lost, from an open and candid discussion of the is-
sues by the two disciplines.69 
69. Such a dialogue is now underway under the auspices of the National Conference 
of Lawyers and Scientists, which is a joint undertaking of the American Association for 
the Advancement of Science and the American Bar Association. The writer is the ABA 
cochairman of the National Conference. See Zurer, Workshop Airs Research Ethics and 
Monitoring of Scientific Misconduct, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, Oct. 5, 1987, at 
44, 46. 

